Let’s revisit a customer who was about to go through an IG Audit. There is one finding that always seems to come up. Default accounts with default passwords. I don’t care if the accounts are expired and locked, if the user still has the default password set, then it’s a finding. Now you can go through all the default accounts and change the password if you want. I’m personally fond of having a script that does the work for me.
This is the script I use to go through and change all the default passwords. Now, once I’m done with this, I go back on set any necessary default accounts such as DBSNMP to a known password. Why, I find it easier to lock all the doors then methodically move through and unlock only the doors that are necessary.
First we are going to need a function that returns an impossible password. Well, in all honesty, it’s not impossible to crack, (that is because given enough horsepower any password can be eventually cracked.) This function will do one thing, return a 30 character randomly generated password of any printable character. There are a couple characters you can’t put in a password, so when we encounter those, we are going to replace them with an integer between 0 – 9.
Next we are going to go through all the default accounts and change the password.
<CODE>DECLARE -- get the list of users with default passwords. CURSOR users_with_defpwd_cur IS SELECT username FROM sys.dba_users_with_defpwd; stmt VARCHAR2(2000); -- the base sql statement passwd VARCHAR2(32); -- the impossible_password. FUNCTION impossible_password RETURN VARCHAR2 AS -- will create a 30 character password wrapped in double quotes. passwd VARCHAR2(32); -- this is the password we are returning. -- we need 32 characters because we are -- wrapping the password in double quotes. p_invalid_char_3 VARCHAR2(1) := '"'; -- invalid password character 3 is '"' p_invalid_char_4 VARCHAR2(1) := ';'; -- invalid password character 4 is ';' BEGIN passwd := SYS.dbms_random.STRING('p',30); -- get 30 printable characters. -- find all the invalid characters and replace them with a random integer -- between 0 and 9. passwd := REPLACE(passwd, p_invalid_char_3, ceil(SYS.dbms_random.VALUE(-1,9))); passwd := REPLACE(passwd, p_invalid_char_4, ceil(SYS.dbms_random.VALUE(-1,9))); -- before we pass back the password, we need to put a double quote -- on either side of it. This is because sometime we are going to -- get a strange character that will cause oracle to cough up a hairball. passwd := '"' || passwd || '"'; RETURN passwd; END;-- main procedure.BEGIN FOR users_with_defpwd_rec IN users_with_defpwd_cur LOOP passwd := impossible_password; stmt := 'alter user ' || users_with_defpwd_rec.username || ' identified by ' || passwd; EXECUTE IMMEDIATE stmt; END LOOP;EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN sys.dbms_output.put_line(sqlerrm); sys.dbms_output.put_line(stmt);END;/</CODE>
The following quote bothered me a lot. “No amount of best practices or prohibitive steps is going to stop a determined hacker.” While this is a true statement, what it leaves out is if you make it difficult by securing the information, the hacker will move onto easier target.
SQL Injection attacks continue to be successful. To secure your data from a sql injection attack, you can start by implementing secure coding standards. Here is a link to my write up on using a secure architecture that to date has been immune from sql injection.
In Oracle 12.1 the ACCESSIBLE BY clause was introduced to the PL/SQL language. This gives the developer the ability mark a package, procedure, function, or type with what was allowed to call it. 12.2 gives us fine grained control over what can the specific functions and procedures in a package.
Here is what 12.1 gave us. As you can see in this example the package getEmpInfo and EmpMaint can both call the package emp_api. I love it, now we have a way to limit what can call a piece of code. But wait, in 12.2 it gets even better, look at example for 12.2
In 12.2 we now have fine grained control over what can call the individual functions and procedures in our package. In the emp_api package the package getEmpInfo can call the functions fGetEmpPhone and fGetEmpManager. The package EmpMaint can call the functions, fDelEmp, fInsEmp, and fUpdateEmp. Now we have fine grained control over what can call the functions and procedures in a specific package.
I have been seeing this database architecture for over thirty years and it’s high time we stopped using it. Before I go too far, let me tell you I get it, you have pressure to get the application out the door and working in a defined timeframe. I still design and develop systems and the pressure to take shortcuts can be great. This short cut is a security killer.
So what have we been doing wrong for all these decades? Put all of the database objects and application code into once schema. This is just a bad idea all around. All it takes is one security bug and the bad guy owns your database. You might as well, put pretty gold wrapping paper with a bow around it and write the bad guy a gift card. If you come to any of my talks, I’ll be happy to demonstrate owning a database, including all your source code and all your data in just a couple of easy commands. But because this is not intended on being a lesson in hacking a database, I wont go into it here.
There is an architecture, that will drastically improve the security of your database. By segmenting your application code from your data and use an API to access the data. Oracle 12c has several PL/SQL enhancements that will make your code much more secure. Oracle 12c PL/SQL now allows you to assign roles to packages, procedures and functions (But you should only be using packages). PL/SQL also now allows you to white list what can execute code. For years, we granted execute to a user, but now you can define what PL/SQL package can call another PL/SQL package using the accessible by clause. We are going to leverage these new features along with authid to define a trusted path that is controllable, fast and secure.
My next several post will move through this architecture, and explaining how to implement it effectively.
The more you tell me, the more ways I can find I can find to attack your system. All I need is one little sql injection bug and trust me, it is most likely there, you just don’t know it yet.
execute process_row(’EMPLOYEES where 1=2 union select owner, name, text from all_source order by owner, name, line –’);
Problem #1 for you, Opportunity #1 for bad guys. Guess what, all of your source code just leaked out from your database.
Problem #2 for you, Opportunity #2 for bad guys. Not putting your your code into packages. If you put your pl/sql into a procedure or a function, I can extract your code from all_source, learn about your system and tailor my attack.
What do you need to do? Put your code into packages. If the code is in a package, the only thing I can get is the package specification.
Problem #2 for you, Opportunity #2 for bad guys. Comments in your package specification. Hey, I’ve been <humor> smacking junior developers with a boat paddle </humor> for years about not commenting their code. The good part is they eventually get it and put in comments. The bad part is comments are being put into the package specification. Some comments are quite verbose and <humor> I really like that</humor>. You are telling the bad guys everything they need to know to exploit your system.
What you need to do? Move all of your comments to the top of the package body and use inline comments in the package body. Again, when I extract your source code, if it’s in a package then I can only get the package specification.
Here is a sample of one of my packages specifications. You are not going to derive too much information from this except maybe what calls it.
CREATE OR REPLACE PACKAGE TARGETAPP.REPORTTARGETAUTHID current_user ACCESSIBLE BY (TARGETAPP.PROCESSTARGET)AS-- constant declarationssVersionCONSTANT VARCHAR2(10) := '20161026.1';FUNCTION MAIN(arg1 IN VARCHAR2, arg2 IN NUMBER) RETURN NUMBER;FUNCTION WHAT_VERSION RETURN VARCHAR2;END;
When I put on my penetration testing hat, all of your source code and comments make my job much easier. I learn exactly how your system is designed and coded and that lets me find all kinds of ways to exploit your system. <humor>Please don’t make my pen testing work too easy, customers will start thinking they are paying me too much money.</humor> And please for goodness sake, make the bad guys life harder; because if you do, they will likely move on to an easier target.
Lets face it, we have deadlines to meet and millions of lines of code in production. I get it, I’ve been a working PL/SQL developer off and on for over 20 years. If we get into the habit of using some of the security features in the language along with some practices, we can improve the security of you code. So, lets get into it.
1) Use packages. Steve Feuerstein http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/issue-archive/index-087690.html has been saying for years to move those functions and procedures to packages and there is good security reasons to do that. If you have a SQL Injection bug in your application, I can get to ALL_SOURCE and read your code and if I can get to your code, I can find other exploits.
So we can read the code in Functions and Procedures.
1SQL>selecttextfrom all_source where owner =userand name ='PARSE_STRING';
2procedure parse_string(p_string varchar2) AS 3CURSOR col_cur IS 4selectdistinct (instr(p_string||',',',',1,level)) loc
6 CONNECT BYLEVEL<= LENGTH(REPLACE(p_string,','))+1 7ORDERBY1;
8 l_col varchar2(65);
9BEGIN10for col_rec in col_cur
12 l_col := substr(p_string, col_rec.loc, instr(p_string, col_rec.loc+1));
13 dbms_output.put_line(l_col ||'col pos '|| col_rec.loc);
161714 rows selected.
1819SQL>createuser u2 identified by MY##56SecurePassword;
2223SQL>grantcreate session to u2;
2627SQL>grantexecuteon parse_string to u2;
3031SQL> conn u2@orcl32Enter password:
34SQL>selecttextfrom all_source where owner ='RLOCKARD'352and name ='PARSE_STRING';
36procedure parse_string(p_string varchar2) AS37CURSOR col_cur IS38selectdistinct (instr(p_string||',',',',1,level)) loc
40 CONNECT BYLEVEL<= LENGTH(REPLACE(p_string,','))+141ORDERBY1;
42 l_col varchar2(65);
43BEGIN44for col_rec in col_cur
46 l_col := substr(p_string, col_rec.loc, instr(p_string, col_rec.loc+1));
47 dbms_output.put_line(l_col ||'col pos '|| col_rec.loc);
505114 rows selected.
Now when we put this into a package, the only thing I can extract from it is the package specification.
1SQL>grantexecuteon utility to u2;
2 3Grant succeeded.
4 5SQL> conn u2@orcl 6Enter password:
8SQL>selecttextfrom all_source where owner ='RLOCKARD' 9and name ='UTILITY';
10211TEXT12--------------------------------------------------------------------------------13package utility AS14procedure parse_string(p_string varchar2);
As we can see, now you only get the package specification. This is really more that I would like to get out, but it’s much better than getting all your source code.
2) Split up your packages into smaller packages based on function. I normally split them up by UTILITY, SENSITIVE and NON SENSITIVE. If there are functions / procedures against sensitive tables those will go into the sensitive packages. You can further break down you sensitive packages. ie: CUSTOMER_API_PKG that would be your interface into your customers table.
3) Limit the execution rights to a package and what a user can do with a package.
3a) We have been granting execute to packages for decades now. Then Oracle 11g gave us Invoker and Definer rights. When you create a package and don’t specify invoker or definer rights, the package is created with definer rights as the default. That’s all well and good, but let’s think this through. If I execute a package with definer rights and that package updates the customers table, even thought I don’t have update on the customers table, the package will work.
1SQL>createorreplace package rlockard.cust_api AS 2function update_customers_credit_limit(pID innumber, pCredit innumber) returnnumber;
4/ 5Package created.
6 7SQL>createorreplace package body rlockard.cust_api AS 8 9function update_customers_credit_limit(pID innumber, pCredit innumber) returnnumberis10 retVal number;
11begin12update customers set credit = pCredit where id = pId;
14 exception when no_data_found
15then16 retVal := helpdesk.utility.log_error(pPkg => $$PLSQL_UNIT, pLine => $$PLSQL_LINE,
17 pParm =>'pID = '|| to_char(iID) ||18' pAmount= '|| to_char(pCredit),
19 pErr => sqlcode);
20return retVal *-1; -- we are flipping the sign to indacate it's an error to caller.21end;
23/24Package body created.
I am going to grant execute to the user U2 that we create earlier and test this.
1SQL>grantexecuteon rlockard.cust_api to u2;
2 3Grant succeeded.
4 5SQL> conn u2@orcl 6Enter password:
8SQL>declare 92 x number;
103begin114 x:=rlockard.cust_api.update_customers_credit_limit(pId =>1770, pCredit =>1000000);
136/1415PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.
1617SQL>select credit from rlockard.customers where id =1770;
18select credit from rlockard.customers where id =177019*20ERROR at line 1:
21ORA-00942: tableorview does not exist
222324SQL> conn rlockard@orcl25Enter password:
27SQL>select credit from rlockard.customers where id =1770;
Did you expect that to happen? How are we going to tighten this down. We are going to set the package to use invokers rights. By adding AUTHID CURRENT_USER to the package specification, the package executes with U2’s rights. U2 does not have any rights on the customers table, the package fails with ORA-00942: table or view does not exists.
1SQL>createorreplace package rlockard.cust_api
2AUTHID CURRENT_USER 3AS 4function update_customers_credit_limit(pID innumber, pCredit innumber) returnnumber;
6/ 723456 8Package created.
91011SQL> conn u2@orcl12Enter password:
14SQL>declare15 x number;
16begin17 x := rlockard.cust_api.update_customers_credit_limit(pId =>1770, pCredit =>2500000);
18exception when others then19 sys.dbms_output.put_line(sqlerrm);
21/22ORA-00942: tableorview does not exist
2324SQL> conn rlockard@orcl25Enter password:
27SQL>select credit from customers where id =1770;
3b) In Oracle 12c we were given the ability to grant roles to packages. (procedures and functions too, but you should be using packages) Now, when we have sensitive tables in another schema, we can create a role that a package needs and grant that role to a package.
1CREATE ROLE update_customers;
2 3grant update_customers to rlockard;
4 5GRANTSELECT 6ON customers
8 9GRANT update_customers TO PACKAGE cust_api;
1011declare12 x number;
13begin14 x := rlockard.cust_api.update_customers_credit_limit(pId =>1770, pCredit =>2500000);
15exception when others then16 sys.dbms_output.put_line(sqlerrm);
3c) Oracle 12c also gave us the accessible by clause. This creates a white list of the packages that can call a package. This way you are narrowing down the ways a package can get called, creating a trusted path to your secure data. So here the public package can call the private package, but if anything else tries to call it a PLS-00904 error will be raised.
1SQL>createorreplace package public_package AS 2procedure update_customers(pId innumber,
3 pColumn invarchar2,
4 pValue invarchar2);
6/ 7 8Package created.
910SQL>createorreplace package body public_package as11procedure update_customers(pId innumber,
12 pColumn invarchar2,
13 pValue invarchar2) IS14 x number; -- we know it's a function that returs a number.15begin-- this is simplistic to demo accessable_by16if pColumn ='CREDIT'then17 x := rlockard.cust_api.update_customers_credit_limit(pId => pId, pCredit => pValue);
21/2223Package body created.
2425SQL>createorreplace package rlockard.cust_api
26accessible by (public_package) AS27function update_customers_credit_limit(pID innumber, pCredit innumber) returnnumber;
3233SQL>3435SQL>declare36 x number;
37begin38 x := rlockard.cust_api.update_customers_credit_limit(pId =>1770, pCredit =>2500000);
39exception when others then40 sys.dbms_output.put_line(sqlerrm);
42/43x := rlockard.cust_api.update_customers_credit_limit(pId =>1770, pCredit =>2500000);
44*45ERROR at line 4:
46ORA-06550: line 4, column8:
47PLS-00904: insufficient privilege to access object CUST_API
48ORA-06550: line 4, column3:
49PL/SQL: Statement ignored
505152SQL>begin53 public_package.update_customers(pId =>1771, pColumn =>'CREDIT', pValue =>'200');
55/5657PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.
But when we call it from the package in the accessible by clause, then it works fine. Again, we are limiting the paths to get to the sensitive information.
4a) We are getting down to the meat of what every shop should be doing. Reviewing code. You should be looking for dynamic code that is concatenating variables together. This is a painfully bad piece of code with a major SQL Injection bug.
2 (p_email logins.email%type DEFAULTNULL,
3 p_password logins.password%type DEFAULTNULL)
4AS 5 6 STMT CONSTANT VARCHAR2(4000) := 7'SELECT email
8 FROM logins
9 WHERE email = '''|| p_email ||10''' AND password = '''|| p_password ||'''';
1112 l_result logins.email%type;
13BEGIN1415 dbms_output.put_line ('SQL STMT: '|| STMT);
1617EXECUTE IMMEDIATE STMT INTO l_result;
1819 dbms_output.put_line ('Logon succeeded.');
2021EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN22null; -- OH NO HE DID NOT 23END UserLogin;
How would I fix this. Well, lets’ change the dynamic SQL and put in some bind variables. We can still do a lot more with this code, but this fixes the SQL Injection bug and a couple other issues.
Now you will find I love code reviews. Frequently we learn a way to do something and because it works, we continue doing it. Heck, I loved cursor for loops until I learned better in a code review. Code reviews should be approached as learning opportunities. You are going to learn a lot more tricks reading other peoples code and you may catch something that will improve the security of your system.
So in review the steps you can do now to improve the security posture of your applications are: Control the rights to executing code. Put everything in packages. Split up your packages. Do code reviews.
August 13, 2018: NOTE UPDATE TO POST THIS IS SPECIFIC TO Oracle 12.1 and bellow. Oracle 12.2 and above, you can change an unencrypted tablespace to an encrypted tablespace.
1) When we start talking about securing information, the first thing that always seems to come up is encryption. Everyone has heard about it, but some don’t really understand just what encryption is protecting. When we are discussing Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) we are discussing data at rest. The attack vectors we are protecting from is a bad actor gaining access to the physical hardware.
1a) Now, the easiest and fastest way to implement TDE is to encrypt tablespaces and move the sensitive data into the encrypted tablespace. You need to be careful here, just because you identified the tables that are sensitive, what about objects that are dependent on the table? (Indexes, Materialized Views, etc). Each of these sensitive objects need to be moved into encrypted tablespaces.
Find dependent objects.
set pagesize 1000 set linesize 132 col owner format a30 col name format a30 select d.owner, d.name, s.tablespace_name, t.encrypted from dba_dependencies d, dba_segments s, dba_tablespaces t where d.owner = s.owner and d.name = s.segment_name and s.tablespace_name = t.tablespace_name and referenced_name IN ( SELECT segment_name FROM dba_segments WHERE tablespace_name IN (SELECT tablespace_name FROM dba_tablespaces WHERE tablespace_name = upper('&&tbs'))) UNION SELECT i.owner, i.index_name, i.tablespace_name, dd.ENCRYPTED FROM dba_indexes i, dba_tablespaces dd WHERE i.tablespace_name = dd.tablespace_name AND table_name IN ( SELECT segment_name FROM dba_segments WHERE tablespace_name IN (SELECT tablespace_name FROM dba_tablespaces WHERE tablespace_name = upper('&&tbs')));
You can not change an unencrypted tablespace into an encrypted tablespace, so you are going to need to first create the encrypted tablespace. UPDATE, in Oracle 12.2 and above you can change an unencrypted tablespace into an encrypted tablespace.
Now that we have an encrypted tablespace, we need to start moving all the sensitive data into it. It’s important to know, that to prevent ghost data you we are going to need to move everything out of the tablespace and into a new tablespace. I normally use alter table move, but you can also use dbms_redefination and create table as select. Use the report from dependent objects to make sure you have everything out of the tablespace. Once you have everything out, drop the tablespace then use a utility like shred to over right the data file(s) with random data. Once you have done that, you can safely delete the data file(s).
Here is a link to my demo on moving data to an encrypted tablespace. This demo assumes the base table is already in the encrypted tablespace, now we need to move indexes and materialized views. https://www.youtub
TDE also offers column encryption, the analysis required to properly implement column based encrypted is time consuming. So for now we are going to pass over column encryption.
1b) SQLNet encryption. Information that moves through the network is subject to various attacks including man in the middle, replay and modification attacks. With these data can be leaked, corrupted, or even replayed. So we use sqlnet encryption and integrity to protect our data from leaking, replays and modification. You are going to user net manager to setup. Make an encryption or integrity method either Accepted, Requested, Rejected or Required. You can read more on these in the Oracle Documentation.
$ORACLE_HOME/bin/netmgr Open local –> profile then select network security and click on the encryption tab. Select the encryption algorithms you need and then enter 256 characters in the encryption seed block.
Select an integrity method. Remember MD5 has several weaknesses. SHA has become the defacto standard.
2) Audit your users and environment. I’ve have heard this one time and time again, “It’s not my job. It’s the auditors job.” The fact remains many breaches exists for weeks, months and even years before they are discovered. Than when a breach is discovered, the auditor request audit logs. We need to do better!. I get audit reports every morning and review them before I do anything else. So what do you want to audit?
2a) Audit login failures. Login failures can be a sign someone is trying to gain access to your system. If you start seeing login failures, investigate. Is the issue user training or is there something else going on.
2b) Audit logins from yesterday. Why you are going to be looking at os_username / username / userhost to see if people are logging in from multiple workstations. This could be an indicator of a username/password being shared. Another reason I do this audit is to check os_username / username. Is the user using their proper account. I have issues in the past where a user was using the application login to do their normal work. This audit showed this and allowed us to correct the situation.
2c) Audit logins for the past 31 days. This gives you a 30,000 foot picture on how often users are connecting and are then disconnecting at the end of the day.
set heading off set pagesize 1000 set linesize 132 set serveroutput on col object_name format a24 col object_type format a24 col doctype format a10 col userhost format a40 col os_username format a15 col username format a15 col terminal format a15 spool $HOME/session_audit.txt select 'login failures' from dual; select os_username, username, userhost, terminal, to_char(timestamp, 'dd-mon-rr hh24:mi') from dba_audit_session where returncode != 0 and trunc(timestamp) >= trunc(sysdate-1) and username != 'DUMMY' order by timestamp /
select 'logins yesterday' from dual; select os_username, username, userhost, count(*) from dba_audit_session where trunc(TIMESTAMP) >= trunc(sysdate-1) and username != 'DUMMY' and action_name != 'LOGOFF BY CLEANUP' group by os_username, username, userhost order by os_username, username /
select 'logins last 31 days' from dual; select os_username, username, userhost, count(*) from dba_audit_session where trunc(TIMESTAMP) >= trunc(sysdate-31) and username != 'DUMMY' and action_name != 'LOGOFF BY CLEANUP' group by os_username, username, userhost order by os_username, username /
2d) Audit changes to any database objects. This is a simple query you can start with. You are checking objects based on last_ddl_time and created.
select 'changed / created objects last 24 hours' from dual; select owner, object_type, object_name from dba_objects where (trunc(created) >= trunc(sysdate-1) or trunc(last_ddl_time) >= trunc(sysdate-1)) order by owner, object_type, object_name /
2e) Use a product like tripwire to check for any changes to ORACLE_HOME. You can also roll your own but getting a checksum of all the files in ORACLE_HOME, than doing the check everyday to see if a file has changed. (there are some files you will want to filter because they change in the normal course of operations)
3) Identify the sensitive data in your database. How can you know what to protect if you don’t know what is sensitive? When you identify what is sensitive, it’s easier to track that data through your enterprise to limit access to the data.
Now there is something most people know but don’t realize they know. You can have a simple piece of data, that by itself is not sensitive, but when combine it with other data that’s not sensitive and now you have sensitive data. IE: I’m Robert, that by itself is not vary valuable. Combine that with my zip code that is not very sensitive and you have narrowed down the universe of Roberts’. Next add that I drive a Ford F150 and a BMW R1150RS, now you have uniquely identified me.
3b) If you have not already done so, you can reverse engineer your application scheme into Oracle SQL Developer Data Modeler. SQL Developer Data Modeler has the ability to mark and report columns that are sensitive.
Heli made a blog entry on how to mark and report on sensitive data in SQL Developer Data Modeler. Sensitive Data From Heli
4) Create trusted paths to your sensitive data. Or at the very least, limit the number of paths to get to your sensitive data. Now that you have a list of sensitive data, document where that data is getting accessed by. You can use unified_audit_trail to get hosts names and users accessing the data. Once you have validated how the data is getting accessed and from where and by who you can setup Virtual Private Database and redaction to limit the paths to get to the sensitive data.
Here is a simple example, if people who are authorized to access the data are in a specific subnet, then you can check the subnet and use the VPD policy to append where 1=2 onto the where clause to anyone querying the data from outside that subnet. You can also use authentication method in this check. Say the data is so sensitive you only want people to access it if they connected using RADIUS. If someone connected using anything else, again you would append where 1=2 onto the where clause to return nothing. This important thing to remember is, Your VPD policy can be anything you can code in PL/SQL.
Lets start this with setting up some support objects in the security schema.
Setup a table of ip_addresses and if the user is granted access to credit card number, social security number and if they user has customer access.
I’m keep seeing this common mistake; The application schema was granted DBA privileges. Here is the problem, when a sql injection bug is found, then all DBA commands are available to the attacker.
The truth is, granting DBA to an application schema is the lazy way to get your application the privileges it requires to operate. Heck, I’m still seeing COTS applications that in the install guide say GRANT DBA TO . COTS applications require DBA privileges are poorly designed.
To fix this. Audit that app user to see what are it’s actually doing.
where username = ‘&USER’
group by obj_name,
Use the results of the query to derive what privileges are actually needed.
Last week one of my customers called me into a meeting to discuss moving a critical application to the cloud. This application is very sensitive to the customer and the data it holds is very sensitive to my customers customer. The results of this meeting turned into a list of questions forwarded the customers executive staff and also a set of questions for the cloud vendor.
This Cloud vendor is providing a COTS solution storing personally identifiable information tax and other very sensitive information. Because of this a number of the questions focus on the protection of PII and the destruction of unneeded copies of data.
I have redacted customer and vendor information from this list of questions, these questions may serve as a baseline for your organization to come up with questions for your Cloud vendors. Point of note the answers to these questions will more likely than not cause follow-up questions.
Here is the list of questions for the customers executive staff to address.
As <REDACTED> moves towards cloud based computing solutions, <REDACTED> must consider the following to create standards for all cloud based systems going forward:
Will <REDACTED> require TLS on day 1? If not, vendor must have a plan and a deadline to get off SSL and on to TLS?
Will <REDACTED> require DISA STIG standards (Fed DOD standard) for all off site cloud data?
Will <REDACTED> require PENetration testing and at what frequency (Federal standard is 1 year)?
What level of data destruction is required for <REDACTED>’s secure/PII data being stored on a cloud based system controlled by non-<REDACTED> vendors?
Will <REDACTED> hold AES256 as the minimum encryption standard for cloud based systems?
Will <REDACTED> require 3DES minimum 168 bits?
Will <REDACTED> require a minimum of 7 wipes for secure/PII data stored on cloud based systems?
Will <REDACTED> require in sales contract with stated frequencies, independent audits to ensure <REDACTED>’s stated audit, encryption and data destruction plans are in effect and compliant?
Will <REDACTED> require internal <REDACTED> audits and/or legislative audits be performed on <REDACTED> systems?
The sales contract must state the “break up” plan for all <REDACTED> data including the delivery back to <REDACTED>, the destruction of the data on vendor systems and the certification that all data has been destroyed according to the <REDACTED> standards. Independent audit to verify results.
Will <REDACTED> require all data stay within the United States, with no data ever leaving the US?
What will <REDACTED> require regarding the vetting standard for cloud vendor trusted inside employees?
What will <REDACTED> require regarding liability insurance in the event of a security incident?
As <REDACTED> data is highly sensitive and contains a great deal of PII for each firm, the following are questions to be answered:
1. Regarding the destruction of sensitive/PII data on <REDACTED> systems, how will you destroy unnecessary copies of data and ensure the necessary copies are encrypted and secure?
2. Is the use of AES256 and 3DES encryption consistent throughout <REDACTED> enterprise as referenced on page 10 of the Security Management Plan? How many bits are used for 3DES?
3. Initial Source Data/Document Load files (via sftp per <REDACTED> docs): Controls/Audit – <REDACTED> should know exactly who touched the load files and for what purpose via audit reports.
4. Additionally, after migration is complete, <REDACTED> to certify (via independent audit) that all source data has been destroyed and no ghost data remains on servers or work stations.
5. Cross boarder – will the data leave the United States for any reason at any time?
6. What analytics software packages are in use to monitor account activity for our <REDACTED> employees as well as <REDACTED> trusted inside employees? How will audit reports be delivered to <REDACTED>?
7. What does “in compliance with Cyber Security Standard” refer to as mentioned on page 6 of the <REDACTED> Security Management Plan? Is this a subset or superset of NIST?
8. On page 7 of the <REDACTED> Security Management Plan in reference to Export Servers under System Architecture, how is the use of these Export Servers audited and after the export is no longer required, how will you certify that the data has been destroyed? If used, can an unencrypted copy of the export be made?
9. Will all backups be encrypted with 3DES and at what bit level? How will <REDACTED> certify the destruction of old backups?
10. What is the plan for <REDACTED>’s system using TLS?
11. Does <REDACTED> harden sqlserver to DISA STIG standards? If not, is it a superset or a subset?
12. What is the end of contract plan for all <REDACTED> data including the delivery back to <REDACTED>, the destruction of the data on <REDACTED> systems and the certification that all data has been destroyed according to the <REDACTED> standards.
13. In the event of a security incident, does <REDACTED> have liability insurance to cover associated losses?
14. How are your trusted inside employees are vetted (DBA’s, System Admins, Network Admins, etc)?
15. If you perform PEN testing, what is the frequency of the testing and will <REDACTED> get a redacted copy of the results of each test?